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Unconstitutional Racial Classification and 
De Facto Segregation 
Classification along racial lines, when involving state action, is 
unconstitutional.1 Such classification may violate the due process or 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the fifteenth 
amendment,2 and it has been held invalid in the fields of education,8 
transportation,4 voting,11 recreational facilities,6 ownership and use of 
real property, 7 and jury selection. 8 
I. THE TESTS 
Where the distinction appears on the face of the legislation, 
labeling it unconstitutional presents no difficulties.9 But as soon 
as racial classification was declared unconstitutional it became 
apparent that efforts to keep the races apart would not take such a 
simple form. More skillfully designed schemes would certainly arise 
to achieve a separation of the races whenever such was the goal.1° 
I. For example, even the deliberate inclusion of Negroes on a grand jury has been 
held within the constitutional prohibition against discrimination by race. Collins v. 
Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964). However, in the area of school segregation, it 
has been argued that classification along racial lines for the purpose of promoting 
integration is so necessary to eliminate the harm caused by unconstitutional separa• 
tion of the races that such classifications are not prohibited. See Note, Racial Imbalance 
in the Public Schools, 50 VA. L. REV. 464 (1964). See also Maslow, De Facto Public 
School Segregation, 6 Vrr.L. L. REv. 353 (1961); Comment, De Facto Segregation-A. 
Study in State Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 722 (1963). 
2. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § I. 
3. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
4. E.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). 
5. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953). See also Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949). 
6. E.g., Mayor &: City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (affirming decision 
below invalidating racial segregation at public bathing beach); Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (vacating opinions below and directing the district court 
to enter an order banning segregation in the use of a public golf course). 
7. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
8. E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
475 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1879). 
9. E.g., School Segregation Cases, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 
U.S. 60 (1917); Strauder v. West Virginia, supra note 8. 
IO. This conclusion is amply supported by a study of ,the school segregation 
problem. Attempts to avoid nullification of segregation were predicted prior to the 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of laws requiring segregation in public schools. 
Leflar &: Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARv. L. REv. 377 (1954). 
Such predictions proved true indeed. Certain evasive legislative attempts were sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 
1962); Gibson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 246 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1957). Compare 
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724- (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). 
[913] 
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Where the classification does not directly appear in the words of 
the statute, discovering violations of the Constitution is more 
difficult. However, means have been developed to determine whether 
there is racial classification involving state action. First, the 
application of a nondiscriminatory law may be demonstrated to 
involve considerations of race. For instance, in the field of jury 
selection, the law may set forth a reasonable means by which to 
select jurors, but the officials executing the law may exercise their 
discretion in such a manner that the ultimate result is a racial 
classification.11 Where the application of such a law makes it 
apparent that there has been racial discrimination, the prohibition 
of the Constitution applies.12 
Second, even though racial considerations do not appear in the 
words of the statute and there is no abuse of discretion in administer-
ing it, unconstitutional discrimination may be apparent from the 
efject of the law. The leading case in this area is Gomillion v. Light-
foot, 18 which involved the redrawing of the boundaries of the City 
of Tuskegee by the Alabama Legislature. The resulting new city 
possessed twenty-eight sides, forming a very odd geometric configura-
tion.14 The change from a square figure to this configuration had the 
effect of including almost all the white people of the former city in 
the new one and leaving outside the new boundaries almost all the 
Negro residents of the former city.15 The United States Supreme 
Court held that this mathematical demonstration of purposeful 
See Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 193 (1964); Com• 
ment, State Efforts To Circumvent Desegregation-Private Schools, Pupil Placement, 
and Geographic Segregation, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 354 (1959). See also Knowles, School 
Desegregation, 42 N.C.L. REv. 67 (1963). 
11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Accord, Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
(1950) (Where no more than one Negro had served on each of a series of grand juries 
during a five-year period, systematic discrimination was established, even though the 
commissioners in charge of the selection of the grand jury had not made attempts to 
familiarize themselves with the racial nature of the eligible jurors, but had chosen 
jurors from acquaintances.); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (Where the proof 
showed that no Negro had ever been known to serve on any jury in a community in 
which legally qualified Negroes resided, racial classification was established.). 
12. The criteria of being able to "understand and explain" any article of the 
federal constitution was applied to Negroes and not to whites. Its effect was to allow 
just whites to vote, and hence was held to violate the fifteenth amendment. Davis v. 
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949). 
13. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). This decision caused considerable comment in legal 
periodicals. Most were concerned with the removal of municipal definition of bound-
aries from the sphere of the unassailable "political question." E.g., 12 BAYLOR. L. REv. 
330 (1960); 11 HAsTINGS L.J. 482 (1960); 31 MISS. L.J. 173 (1960); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 
1173 (1961). 
14. Appendix to Opinion of the Court, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra note 13, 
at 348. 
15. Id. at 341. A similar situation was held violative of the state constitution where 
the line drawn for a school district meandered up various streets and alleys, placing 
all of the Negro students in one district and the whites in others. Webb v. School 
Dist. No. 90, 167 Kan. 395, 206 P.2d 1066 (1949). 
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classification along racial lines involved the abridgement of the vote 
of the Negro because his vote did not exercise the influence over 
the geographical area that it had before, and, therefore, constituted a 
violation of the fifteenth amendment.16 Although the facts were 
complete in this setting, the Court noted the absence of "any 
countervailing municipal function"17 to be served by the redefinition 
of the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee in this manner. In this 
posture, Gomillion left two basic situations for further litigation: 
(1) the case in which the mathematics of the situation do not lead 
to a definite conclusion and which consequently requires further 
scrutiny to determine the true nature of the legislation, and (2) the 
case in which there is a countervailing function involved in a setting 
which raises the inference of racial discrimination. 
A. Inconclusive Mathematics 
In Wright v. Rockefeller,18 the New York Legislature reap-
portioned its congressional districts with the resulting effect that the 
composition of the Eighteenth Congressional District is 86 per cent 
Negro and Puerto Rican. The Nineteenth District is only 28.5 per 
cent non-white; the Twentieth, only 27.5 per cent; and the Seven-
teenth contains only 5.1 per cent of these minority groups.19 
Although it is quite obvious that greater racial balance could have 
been achieved among these contiguous districts,20 there was nothing 
to indicate sufficiently that racial considerations influenced the selec-
tion of the boundaries.21 Apparently the racial mathematics did not 
demonstrate with the certainty found in Gomillion that there was 
racial classification.22 
Whether the classification in Gomillion would have withstood 
constitutional attack if the percentages in that case were not quite 
as demonstrative as they were cannot be known. Although the con-
clusion would seem implicit in Wright, that decision did not settle all 
the remaining problems of mathematical demonstration of racial 
classification. A further problem is created when a geographical area 
16. Mr. Justice Whittaker felt that the fifteenth amendment was not the appro-
priate ground for the decision, arguing that the Negroes could still vote. He felt that 
the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause offered the better foundation for 
the decision. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 839, 849 (1960) (concurring opinion). 
17. Id. at 842. 
18. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
19. Id. at 54. 
20. This is clear even though the heavy concentration of Negro and Puerto Rican 
residents in one area would have made a more equal distribution of races very dif-
ficult. Id. at 57. 
21. This determination was made by the lower court, Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 
F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), and accepted by the Supreme Court. Wright v. Rockefeller, 
376 U.S. 52, 57 (1964). 
22. The dissent found that the eleven-sided figure demonstrated racial considera-
tions sufficient to raise a "rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality." Wright v. 
Rockefeller, supra note 18, at 72-73 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
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is comprised exclusively of one race as an effect of a classification, 
but the excluded part is biracial in an inconclusive proportion. This 
situation was presented for judicial consideration in Taylor v. 
Township of Dearborn.23 A new city was formed by joining two 
noncontiguous unincorporated areas with a strip of land taken from 
an incorporated village in the same township.24 The new city was in-
habited almost exclusively by white residents; the persons left in 
the township village included both Negroes and whites.25 This latter 
fact impressed the court, and it held that there was no denial of 
constitutional rights under either the fourteenth or the fifteenth 
amendment.26 Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to 
consider a factual situation similar to that in Taylor, the reasoning 
in that case is persuasive. Both the included and excluded areas must 
be examined, and such an inspection must reveal an almost total 
separation of races before a conclusion of unconstitutional racial 
classification can be properly established. Assuming the acceptance 
of the Taylor result, the significance of the Gomillion decision would 
seem to be that no mathematical demonstration other than virtually 
total separation of the races can lead to possible constitutional con-
demnation. In attempting to establish conclusions from the effect of 
an act, Gomillion seems to be of limited application and confined 
to its own peculiar facts-virtually complete segregation of the races. 
B. Countervailing Functions 
Even where the mathematical discussion gives rise to suspicion 
of discrimination, the existence of a countervailing municipal 
function may exert considerable influence in the analysis of legisla-
tion which indulges in geographic classification. The established• 
policy is that the legislature can make a reasonable classification, and 
the judiciary will not inquire into the intention or motive of 
the legislature in making the classification.27 This policy does 
not offend the equal protection clause of the Constitution because 
of the practical and desirable necessity of allowing legislative 
23. 370 Mich, 47, 120 N.W.2d 737 (1963), 48 MINN. L. REv. 604 (1964), 10 WAYNE 
L. REV. 229 (1964). 
24. The strip between the two noncontiguous areas was taken to satisfy the 
common-law requirement of municipal contiguity. Township of Genessee v. Genessee 
County, 369 Mich. 592, 120 N.W .2d 759 (1963). 
25. Brief for Appellants, app., pp. 20a, 785a. "Of the remaining 15,720 persons who 
reside in the Dearborn Township portion of Inkster Village, 11,120 whites and 
4,600 Negroes are excluded from the new city." Taylor v. Township of Dearborn, 370 
Mich. 47, 62,120 N.W.2d 737,745 (1963). 
26. Id. at 56, 61, 63, 120 N.W .2d at 742, 745, 746. 
27. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). This policy has also been 
stated; "If the act done by the State is legal, .•. it is quite out of the power of any 
court to inquire what was the intention of those who enacted the law." Doyle v. Con-
tinental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 541 (1876). 
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programs to adjust to varying conditions.28 The possibility is imme-
diately apparent that the concept of a countervailing function may 
be abused to create a far;ade behind which unconstitutional racial 
classification can find a meaningful existence. This possibility sharply 
conflicts with the Supreme Court declaration that racial classifica-
tion will not be tolerated, whether it is "ingeniously or ingenuously" 
designed. 29 In one instance there is a policy that permits legislation 
to be formulated to meet the variety of conditions that influence the 
aspects of a problem requiring legislation. The other policy is one 
that invalidates invidious racial classification whenever and wher-
ever it appears. Each of these policies was announced without an 
attempt to reconcile the other in the situation in which there are 
multiple effects of a legislative act. 
II. INTERPRETATIVE TECHNIQUES AND LIMITATIONS 
Where there is a•legislative enactment having multiple effects,80 
it is possible that racial classification is the result desired. If so, the 
existence of concepts which would avail an intelligent search to 
discover whether the acts are constitutional, resulting in de facto 
segregation, or whether the acts are unconstitutional classifications 
along racial lines, becomes of critical importance. Certain doctrines 
have been developed to define the scope and nature of the judicial 
inquiry into the validity of such statutes. 
A. Judicial Restraint 
The doctrine of judicial restraint requires that the judiciary 
not investigate further if it finds the classification to be within the 
power of the legislature. In State ex rel. City of Creve Coeur v. 
Weinstein,81 the local body had the plenary power to establish 
recreational facilities in the community. It exercised this power by 
condemning the land that a Negro had purchased in order to reside 
in the all-white community. The Negro alleged that the decision to 
condemn his land for recreational facilities was specifically designed 
28. Population is a condition which requires adjustments of a legislative program 
in a certain area. For instance, the problems of selecting jurors in a metropolitan area 
is far different from those in a rural area. Hence, a specific method of selecting jurors 
that is based on such a consideration is valid. Farrington v. Pinckney, l N.Y.2d 74, 
l!l!I N.E.2d 817 (1956). 
29. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l (1958); Smith v. Texas, !Ill U.S. 128 (1940); Lane 
v. Wilson, !107 U.S. 268 (19!19). 
30. The types of countervailing municipal functions that involve geographic choice, 
with possible collateral effects of racial classification, include: (I) incorporation of a 
city, (2) redefinition of a city's boundaries, (3) the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain to condemn land for municipal purposes, including parks, playgrounds, 
municipal buildings, etc., (4) urban renewal, and (5) drawing of school and other 
districts. 
31. !129 S.W .2d !199 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). 
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to oust him from the neighborhood.82 But the court held that since 
the purpose of the legislation was within the power of the body, the 
motive could not properly be the subject of judicial inquiry.88 
Although this approach undoubtedly has value, it should not be 
extended too far. A judicial body cannot disregard constitutional 
matters by relying on legislative judgment.34 A court must exercise 
diligence in discerning a false front disguising state-created segrega-
tion of races. In Wiley v. Richland Water District,35 a Negro family 
was contemplating the construction of a home in a previously all-
white residential area. The local Water District condemned the 
land for future development and sanitation control.86 The court 
did not distinguish between purpose and motive, but found that the 
whole proceeding was based upon a desire to deprive the plaintiffs 
of the use of the land solely because they were Negroes.87 Although 
factually similar to Weinstein, the Wiley case can be distinguished. 
There the Water District condemnation was merely enacted, 
but none of the procedural steps were taken to carry out the 
announced purpose behind the condemnation.38 The failure to 
follow· through on the process almost conclusively demonstrated 
that the action was merely a fa~ade to hide segregation. 
B. Judicial Notice 
Assuming that a court may make further inquiry into the 
effect of legislation, it often must utilize the technique of judicial 
notice to guide it in determining the true nature of the legislation 
in question. In Meredith v. Fair,39 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit was presented with the situation in which admission 
to the University of Mississippi was conditioned upon the recom-
mendation of alumni.40 There was testimony by officials that all 
policies and regulations were adopted and followed without regard 
to racial considerations.41 Nevertheless, the court was able to 
invalidate this otherwise reasonable requirement by taking judicial 
32. The defendant Negroes alleged that there had been attempts to buy them out, 
a refusal to issue a plumbing permit to their contractor, and now this condemnation 
action. Id. at 402. 
33. Id. at 406. 
34. Cf. cases note 29 supra. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 573 (1960) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
35. Civil No. 60-207, D. Ore., June 30, 1960, 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 788 (1960). 
36. The Superintendent of the Richland Water District indicated that there were 
two problems to consider: color and water. Id. at 788. 
37. Id. at 790. 
38. Ibid. 
39. 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962). 
40. Id. at 351. 
41. At a hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction, nearly every member of 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Mississippi testified that all policies and 
regulations were adopted and followed without regard to race, creed, or color. 
Meredith v. Fair, 202 F. Supp. 224 (S.D. Miss. 1962). 
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notice of the segregationist tendencies in the area.42 With the aid 
of judicial notice, any doubt as to the impropriety of the recom-
mendation requirement was dispelled. However, the availability of 
judicial notice as a meaningful tool has serious limitations. It may 
be exceedingly difficult to take judicial notice of such a policy in a 
community that suppresses its prejudice. If social pressure or 
discretion demands that ·outward bias be concealed, the ability to 
take judicial notice of the existence of these attitudes is almost 
impossible.43 
Of course, the task of discovering de facto segregation is simplified 
if the persons involved in the official action under analysis admit 
that they considered unacceptable factors in their deliberations. In 
Kreger v. Board of Trustees of Georgetown Independent School 
District,44 where the members of the school board had announced 
a desire to segregate until ordered to integrate,45 the court ordered 
an injunction to restrain the board from expending funds for the 
erection of buildings designed and located to maintain school segrega-
tion. A similar result was reached in Hall v. St. Helena Parish School 
Board,46 where the new school plan was accompanied by out-of-court 
declarations by the sponsors of the act that the plan was aimed at 
avoiding integration.47 In Clemons v. Board of Educ.,48 although a 
desire to integrate was officially declared, the school board's admis-
sion of a policy of temporary segregation during a building program 
was revealed as a deliberate policy of racial discrimination when the 
board formed one attendance area from two noncontiguous zones 
consisting largely of Negro residents.49 As such it was invalidated as 
unconstitutional. However, discovering unconstitutional considera-
tions becomes more difficult when the actors are silent. Such silence 
is to be expected upon the realization that an announcement cannot 
be made without seriously impairing the validity of the legislation 
involved. 
42. Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 344-45 (1962). 
43. One of the essential requirements of judicial notice is -that the fact must be one 
which can be established authoritatively. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2565-83 (3d ed. 
1940); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 323-31 (1954). Taking judicial notice of another's 
state of mind is obviously difficult and beyond the proper scope of the technique. 
Comment, State Efforts To Circumvent Desegregation-Private Schools, Pupil Place-
ment, and Geographic Segregation, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 354, 360 (1959). 
44. 368 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). 
45. Id. at 875. 
46. 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), 30 FoRDHAM L. REv. 510 (1962)~ 
47. Judicial notice of the declarations aided in making the unconstitutionality of 
the plan apparent. "In short, the legislative leaders announced without equivocation 
that the purpose of the packaged plan was to keep the state in the business of 
providing public education on a segregated basis." Hall v. St. Helena Parish School 
Ild., supra note 46, at 653. 
48. 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), 34 TEXAS L. REv. 1085 (1956). 
49. Clemons v. Board of Educ., supra note 48, at 856. 
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In Evans v. Buchanan50 the plaintiffs mathematically demon-
strated that racial considerations were influential in determining the 
location of school boundaries. This evidence was held to raise a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality,51 and a final determination was post-
poned until the board had an opportunity to rebut it.52 Rebutting 
such a presumption, however, would not seem difficult. In fact, the 
court indicated that consideration of other matters, such as transpor-
tation, geography and access roads,53 would have rebutted the pre-
sumption. Consequently, the raising of such a presumption does not 
assist if these other factors exist and if there is no announcement 
by the members of the board that improper discriminatory factors 
entered into their deliberations. 
III. JUDICIAL INADEQUACY To ERADICATE DE FACTO SEGREGATION 
It is· quite obvious that racially motivated legislation for an 
otherwise valid public purpose is not easily uncovered. Some courts, 
recognizing this difficulty, have decided that there may exist an 
affirmative duty to integrate, at least in the area of de facto school 
segregation. Although the federal courts have consistently held that 
the fourteenth amendment does not require affirmative integration,114 
there have been declarations in recent decisions that the deleterious 
effect of de facto segregation may impose an affirmative obligation 
on the members of a community.55 
As a consequence of the futility of attack on a reasonable classifi-
cation which has the collateral effect of achieving racial distinc-
tion, many such enactments resulting in de facto segregation 
have been upheld. For example, both incorporation of a new city56 
50. 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962), 63 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 546 (1963), 15 STAN. L. R.Ev. 
681 (1963). 
51. The concept of raising a presumption of unconstitutionality was endorsed by 
Justices Goldberg and Douglas in the dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 
72-73 (1964) (dissenting opinion). 
52. Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Del. 1962). 
53. Id. at 824. 
54. E.g., Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Cohen v. Public 
Housing Administration, 257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958). 
55. In the lower federal courts, Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 
(E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (ED.N.Y. 1962). In the 
state courts, Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878 (1963); 
11 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 414 (1964). See also Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961), 41 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 128 (1962), 38 U. DET. L.J. 479 
(1961). In addition to judicial utterances, some commentators agree that de facto 
segregation is unconstitutional. See Comment, "Equal Protection" and the Neighborhood 
School, 13 CATHouc U.L. REv. 150 (1964). Other commentators only argue that the 
Constitution does not prevent legislation requiring affirmative activity to integrate. 
See, e.g., Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VILL. L. REv. 353 (1961). But 
see Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-The New Rochelle Experience 
(pt. I), 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1963). 
56. Taylor v. Township of Dearborn, 370 Mich. 47, 120 N.W .2d 737 (1963). 
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and condemnation for park purposes,57 although resulting in de 
facto segregation, have withstood attack. In Barnes v. City of Gads-
den,58 urban renewal was instituted which would have rid the city 
of the slums, where almost all of the city's Negroes resided. The 
collateral knowledge that the Negroes would not be able to purchase 
living facilities in the town once the program was complete_d59 (a 
practical consequence of the economic restriction on who could pur-
chase) did not invalidate the program. In Seay v. Patterson,60 the 
governor of Alabama denied a Negro's application for reappointment 
as a notary public. There being no restrictions on the governor's 
power to appoint notaries throughout the state, the court upheld the 
governor's action in the absence of a showing of "bad faith" or 
"arbitrary" action solely because of the man's race.61 In Henry v. 
Godsell,62 a new school district was drawn so that the enrollment 
of the school was overwhelmingly Negro.63 However, the factors of 
ease of transportation, distance, accessibility, and other safety con-
siderations made this determination immune from attack on grounds 
that there had been an unconstitutional classification along racial 
lines.64 
The failure of these constitutional attacks may result in an 
57. State ex rel. City of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, 329 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1959). Accord, Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 26 Ill. 2d 296, 186 N.E.2d 
360 (1962) (Here the condemnation for park purposes followed closely after the 
announcement by a housing developer in that all-white community that it was his in-
tention to rent to both races proportionally to the racial balance in the general area.). 
In a federal case collateral to Deerfield, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that proof of a conspiracy to prevent integration by the local officials against the 
developers would constitute a valid cause of action. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 
286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). On remand, the lower court held that the doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel settled the question of a conspiracy adversely to 
the developer because of the state court decision. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 
219 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1963). 
58. 174 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ala. 1958), afj'd, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 915 (1959). 
59. Id. at 67 
60. 207 F. Supp. 755 (M.D. Ala. 1962). 
61. Id. at 757. 
62. 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958). 
63. Id. at 89. 
64. Id. at 90. Accord, Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Sealy 
v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1957), afj'd, 252 F.2d 
898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). See also McNeese v. Board of Educ., 
305 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1962) (The court noticed that there was no allegation that the 
attendance areas were not based on a rational consideration, although the case was 
sent back because the plaintiffs had not exhausted their state remedies.). Commentators 
on school segregation have recognized the difficulties in attacking attendance areas 
where consideration is publicly given to valid factors. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation 
and the Schools-The General Northern Problem (pt. 2), 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 178 
(1963); Maslow, supra note 55, at 360; Comment, "Equal Protection" and the Neighbor-
hood School, 13 CATHOUC U.L. REv. 150, 155 (1964); Comment, De Facto Segregation-
A Study in State Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 722, 733 (1963); Comment, De Facto Segrega-
tion and the Neighborhood School, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 514, 523 (1963); Note, Racial 
Imbalance in the Public Schools, 50 VA. L. REv. 464, 495 (1964). 
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increased use of otherwise valid legislation to effect a segregation 
of the races. The use of the power of eminent domain poses a signifi-
cant threat to the attempt to end irrational classification along racial 
lines.65 New municipal buildings, new roads and highways, urban 
renewal, and public playgrounds and parks all require the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain. Consequently, all such activity 
seems to present means by which a segregation-minded community 
can improve their municipal facilities, while achieving the intended 
elimination of Negroes in certain areas. Of course, this process 
assumes a conspiracy of silence as to the true nature of the effort.66 
If silence accompanies the acts, the principle of judicial approval of 
a rational legislative classification would seem to preclude a success-
ful attack on the acts, even though one of the effects is de facto segre-
gation. 
If a judicial challenge is made, rigid requirements must be met 
before such an action will be successful. The allegations must be 
specific, and must be fortified by: (I) in the absence of a counter-
vailing function, evidence that the activity clearly demonstrates that 
there has been racial classification, 67 or (2) in the presence of a 
countervailing municipal function, evidence that irrational discrim-
ination appears in the face of the statute68 or that the activity was 
expressly racially motivated.69 These strict requirements have been 
considered desirable in order to insure that the ability of govern-
mental units to dispatch their services and functions will not be 
needlessly inipaired.70 The strictness would preclude any challenge 
that is politically motivated by a desire to impeach the qualifications 
of an officeholder by charging him with racial bias or that is aimed 
at political advantage by obstructing the continuation of municipal 
progress. If the requirements were less, judicial involvement would 
take an unusual form. A court would be forced to weigh, with no 
objective standard, any detrimental influence of the racial aspect of 
a classification against the legislatively approved value of the classifi-
65. The equal protection clause may have greater influence in the area of govern• 
mental planning than merely guarding against racial discrimination. See Williams, 
Planning Law and the Supreme Court, 13 ZONING DIGEST 97 (1961). 
66. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text. 
67. This requirement is derived from Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
68. This requirement is firmly established in many cases. See, e.g., Buchanan v. 
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
69. See, e.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 
1961). 
70. Even where a racial effect may be apparent, commentators have approved 
consideration of prominent beneficial aspects of a rational classification in upholding 
it as valid. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 193, 218 
(1964); Kaplan, supra note 55, at 176, 178; Leflar &: Davis, Segregation in the Public 
Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REv. 377, 412 (1954); Comment, "Equal Protection" and 
the Neighborhood School, 13 CArnouc U.L. REv. 150, 155 (1964). 
March 1965] Racial Classification 923 
cation. This subjective process would require the judiciary to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the legislative body, where its only 
standard is not affirmatively commanded by the Constitution, but 
derived from the guidance given by a negative prohibition.71 
Joseph A. Milchen 
71. The same type of problem as -to judicial remedy exists in this area as in the 
legislative reapportionment field. See Reapportionment Symposium, 6!1 MICH. L. REv. 
209 (1964). Here the problem is more difficult, however, because the controlling 
criteria in each case comes not from an affirmative constitutional standard, but is 
only guided by the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable classification. 
